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Abstract
This research examines the impact of defaults on product choice in sequential-decision settings. Whereas prior research has
shown that a default can affect what consumers purchase by promoting choice of the preselected option, the influence of defaults
is more nuanced when consumers make a series of related choices. In such a setting, consumer preferences may evolve across
choices due to “spillover” effects from one choice to subsequent choices. The authors hypothesize that defaults systematically
attenuate choice spillover effects because accepting a default is a more passive process than either choosing a nondefault option in
the presence of a default or making a choice in the absence of a default. Three experiments and a field study provide compelling
evidence for such default-induced changes in choice spillover effects. The findings show that firms’ setting of high-price defaults
with the aim of influencing consumers to choose more expensive products can backfire through the attenuation of spillover. In
addition to advancing the understanding of the interplay between defaults and preference dynamics, insights from this research
have important practical implications for firms applying defaults in sequential choices.
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Firms that aim to sell products to consumers inevitably are
“choice architects” in that they must decide how to present
their product offerings to prospective buyers (Johnson et al.
2012; Thaler and Sunstein 2008). Setting a default—that is,
prespecifying an option that automatically becomes the
selected one unless a consumer actively selects another avail-
able option—is an important tool of choice architecture.
Defaults have been shown to have a powerful impact on con-
sumers’ decisions (Brown and Krishna 2004; Johnson and
Goldstein 2003; Madrian and Shea 2001; Smith, Goldstein, and
Johnson 2013; Steffel, Williams, and Pogacar 2016; Sunstein
2013).
Default effects have been examined extensively in settings
where consumers make a single choice. However, little is
known about the impact of defaults when consumers make a
sequence of related choices. This is the case, for example, when
products are presented in a format that allows consumers to
configure their product by selecting the specific options they
desire for each of a number of product modules (e.g., when
configuring automobiles, pieces of furniture, holiday packages,
or financial services) or when consumers make several choices
in connection with an overall consumption experience (e.g.,
booking a flight, hotel, and rental car for a trip; configuring a
multicourse meal at a restaurant). Such complex decisions are
best thought of as sequential choice processes because consu-
mers typically make them by selecting one option at a time.
Selecting one of the available options for each of a sequence
of related choices can be an onerous task (Dellaert and Stre-
mersch 2005; Hildebrand, Ha¨ubl, and Herrmann 2014). There-
fore, presenting consumers with defaults in the form of
preselected options has the potential to be helpful in that it may
simplify the choice process. Typically, making the choice
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process less cumbersome for consumers is also in the interest of
the firm (e.g., by reducing the risk that the process will not
result in a purchase). In addition, firms can use defaults in an
attempt to deliberately influence consumers’ choices in a par-
ticular direction—for instance, to promote the sale of products
that are more profitable or to guide consumers toward products
that might render them more satisfied. Firms typically have
many degrees of freedom in setting defaults in a sequence of
choices. For each individual choice, the firm can control
whether one of the options is preselected as a default and, if
so, which specific option is set as the default.
Prior work has shown that setting an option as a default
renders it more likely to be chosen (Johnson and Goldstein
2003; Sunstein 2013). However, whether and how setting a
default for a particular choice influences what options consu-
mers select in subsequent choices has not been examined to
date. Evidence from research on sequences of choices (in the
absence of any defaults) suggests that the choices a consumer
makes can have systematic “spillover” effects on their subse-
quent choices (Levav et al. 2010; Priester, Dholakia, and Flem-
ing 2004; Simon et al. 2008; Simonson and Tversky 1992;
Wilcox and Song 2011). The current work examines how
defaults moderate such choice spillover.
We focus on how defaults affect choice spillover that is
inference-based in that it results from what consumers infer,
either about their own preferences or about the market envi-
ronment, from the choices they make. Our key hypothesis is
that inference-based choice spillover depends on whether the
initial choice is the result of the consumer accepting a default
versus selecting a nondefault option. Choice spillover may
differ depending on whether choices are made actively versus
more passively (Greenberg and Spiller 2016; Schrift and Parker
2014). Selection of a default option does not require extensive
deliberation, as the consumer can simply accept the default, so
it represents a comparatively less thoughtful act than selecting
the same option when it is not the default. Therefore, we predict
that the more passive choice of merely accepting a default
attenuates inference-based choice spillover from such a choice
to subsequent choices.
In the next section, we outline our theorizing about the
nature of preference dynamics in sequential choice processes
and about the role of defaults in these dynamics. Then, we
present evidence from three experiments that were designed
to test the key predictions arising from this theory. This is
followed by an examination of the economic consequences
of multiple defaults in a field study conducted with a major
automobile manufacturer in which consumers configured
their cars using the manufacturer’s online product customiza-
tion system. Converging evidence from these four studies
provides clear support for our theorizing—defaults not only
have a direct impact on the choices for which they are set but
(if accepted) also attenuate inference-based choice spillover
effects on subsequent choices. The article concludes with a
discussion of the theoretical and practical implications of
these findings.
Dynamic Effects of Defaults in Sequential
Consumer Choice
We develop our theorizing about the dynamic effects of
defaults on consumer choice in three steps. First, we consider
the immediate impact of defaults (i.e., how they influence
choice when one of the options is preselected). This is followed
by a discussion of spillover effects in sequences of choices,
whereby consumers’ preferences in connection with a particu-
lar choice can be systematically affected by choices they made
previously. Finally, we theorize about how defaults moderate
spillover effects to subsequent choices by interfering with
inference processes that drive choice spillover.
The Immediate Effects of Defaults
There is ample evidence that defaults affect the choices people
make, typically boosting uptake of a default option (Brown and
Krishna 2004; Johnson and Goldstein 2003; Madrian and Shea
2001; Sunstein 2013). Various explanations for this immediate
effect of defaults have been provided (Brown and Krishna
2004; Dinner et al. 2011). First, consumers may choose the
default option to reduce the cognitive effort associated with
making a decision (Johnson, Bellman, and Lohse 2002; Thaler
and Sunstein 2008). Individuals make trade-offs between the
cognitive resources they allocate to a decision and the impor-
tance or value of making a good decision (Dickhaut, Rusti-
chini, and Smith 2009; Gershman, Horvitz, and Tenenbaum
2015). Passive acceptance of a default can be an effective way
of conserving cognitive resources. In addition, consumers may
make assumptions about a firm’s reasons for setting a default
and interpret a default as an implicit recommendation to select
a particular option (McKenzie, Liersch, and Finkelstein 2006).
Thus, consumers might perceive defaults as endorsements by
the firm and be inclined to select a default option for that
reason. Finally, consumers may feel as though they are missing
out on the default if they choose not to select it. Thus, they may
be averse to the (perceived) loss of the default if they were to
select another option, which can cause them to accept the
default (Park, Jun, and MacInnis 2000; Smith, Goldstein, and
Johnson 2013).
Dynamic Effects in Sequential Choice
Consumers tend to construct their preferences, in part, on the
basis of the way in which a set of choice options is presented
(Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998; Lichtenstein and Slovic
2006; Payne, Bettman, and Schkade 1999; Tversky, Sattath,
and Slovic 1988). Moreover, there is evidence that constructed
preferences influence not only consumers’ choices in the par-
ticular settings in which they originate but also their subsequent
choices (Levav et al. 2010; Simon et al. 2008; Simon, Snow,
and Read 2004). Such spillover effects can originate from var-
ious underlying sources. We focus on choice spillover effects
that are inference-based in that they result from what
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consumers infer, either about their own preferences or about
the market environment, from their choices.
Central to our theorizing is a type of inference-based choice
spillover that we label “preference updating.” We conceptua-
lize preference updating as spillover that arises when prefer-
ences constructed while making a choice (e.g., preference for a
high-quality option) persist to influence a subsequent choice.
The literature on self-perception (e.g., Bem 1967) and cogni-
tive dissonance (e.g., Festinger 1962) suggests that individuals
tend to display consistency in their preferences across related
choices. Moreover, people may infer internal states (e.g., their
attitudes or preferences) from their own overt actions, giving
rise to an updating of these internal states as a consequence of
the choices they make. For instance, the mere act of selecting a
high-price option in one choice might signal a general prefer-
ence for high-quality (and thus expensive) options to the con-
sumer, in turn rendering them more likely to select high-price
options in subsequent choices. While the choices a consumer
makes reflect, at least in part, their prior preferences, those
preferences evolve through an ongoing process of preference
updating that is informed by inferences from the evaluation of
the presented options and the choices made. Thus, the inferen-
tial processes involved in preference construction influence the
preferences that spill over from one choice to the next. The
result is a positive choice spillover such that the probability that
the preference expressed in the subsequent choice will be con-
sistent with the preference exhibited in the current choice is
increased.
Another type of inference-based choice spillover is one that
arises from consumer inferences about the market. The
background-contrast effect (Simonsohn 2006; Simonson and
Tversky 1992) is a prominent example of such inference mak-
ing. It results from the influence of the composition of a set of
options from which a consumer has previously made a choice.
For instance, one might use the attribute levels of the options in
a choice set to make inferences about the trade-off between the
attributes in a given domain, such as how large a difference in
price is (or should be) associated with a particular difference in
product quality. These inferences then serve as the background
against which the options that are available in a subsequent
choice are evaluated, which produces a spillover. For example,
if consumers are able to obtain a large quality improvement for
only a very small increase in price in one choice, this affects the
inferences they make regarding the relationship between qual-
ity and price in that domain (Prelec, Wernerfelt, and Zettel-
meyer 1997), and these inferences may spill over to how much
more consumers are subsequently willing to pay for higher-
quality options in the same domain (Simonson and Tversky
1992)—in this example, less than they might have otherwise.
The result is a negative choice spillover such that the probabil-
ity that the preference expressed in the later choice will be
consistent with the preference exhibited in the earlier choice
is decreased. (In the current example, the same price–quality
trade-off that promotes selection of a higher-quality option in
the earlier choice serves as the background that promotes selec-
tion of a lower-quality option in the subsequent choice.)
A common form of choice spillover that does not require
inference making is balancing, whereby consumers compen-
sate for making choices reflecting one particular preference
direction by subsequently shifting their choices in the opposite
direction (Dhar and Simonson 1999; Khan and Dhar 2006).
Unlike preference updating and background-contrast effects,
balancing is primarily driven by the outcome of an earlier
choice as it relates to some overall target or goal. For instance,
balancing can be the result of consumers considering the out-
come of a particular choice in light of an overall target that they
have in mind for an entire series of choices, such as a total
amount of money to spend or a total number of calories to
consume. Thus, balancing may manifest in a pattern of choices
where, for example, selecting a high-price option on one occa-
sion renders a consumer more likely to select a low-price
option on a subsequent occasion, producing a negative choice
spillover.
In summary, choices made earlier in a sequence of related
choices may have spillover effects on subsequent choices. Pre-
ference updating and background-contrast effects are instances
of choice spillover effects that are driven by what consumers
infer from their own choices, whereas balancing is a form of
choice spillover that results from how the option selected on an
earlier occasion affected some overall target or goal. Next, we
consider the moderating effect of defaults on choice spillover.
Dynamic Effects in Sequential Choice with Defaults
Spillover effects across choices may vary as a function of the
circumstances under which choices are made (Ha¨ubl and Mur-
ray 2003; Khan, Zhu, and Kalra 2011; Priester, Dholakia, and
Flemming 2004; Yoon and Simonson 2008). We propose that a
critical determinant of spillover effects from one choice to
another is whether the option that is selected in the earlier
choice was set as a default or not.
Spillover effects may depend on whether choices are made
actively versus more passively (Greenberg and Spiller 2016;
Schrift and Parker 2014). Selection of a default option does not
require extensive deliberation, as the consumer can simply
accept the default. Consequently, choosing the default option
represents a more passive choice than (1) selecting an option
other than the default and (2) selecting an option in a setting
where none of the options was set as a default. The more
passive nature of the process of accepting the default—com-
pared with actively choosing an option that was not the
default—implies a less thoughtful decision. This is in line with
the finding that individuals who accepted a default subse-
quently have a stronger desire to switch to a different option
(Brown, Farrell, and Weisbenner 2016).
The thoughtfulness of the decision process has important
implications both for the decision itself and for how it may
influence subsequent decisions. Inference-based choice spill-
over effects require a thoughtful decision process (Dhar and
Gorlin 2013). Prior research has shown that context effects are
less pronounced when consumers deliberate less about concrete
(Khan, Zhu, and Kalra 2011) and attribute-level (Mantel and
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Kardes 1999) considerations. For example, background-
contrast effects are attenuated when thoughtfulness is compro-
mised (Priester, Dholakia, and Flemming 2004). This is not
surprising, because inferences that individuals make about
market conditions—through active processing of attribute
information—play an important role in background-contrast
effects (Prelec, Wernerfelt, and Zettelmeyer 1997). The less
thoughtful act of accepting a default should thus reduce
background-contrast effects on subsequent choices.
In the case of preference updating, the less thoughtful choice
of a default option should make that choice less informative
about consumers’ own preferences and, thus, suppress any
inferences about their preferences that consumers might make
from it, compared with a choice that is made more actively.
Therefore, we hypothesize that defaults attenuate preference
updating if—and only if—they are accepted, and that they do
so as a result of the less thoughtful processing associated with
passive default acceptance compared with the active selection
of a nondefault option.
In the case of balancing, spillover effects result from pursuit
of multiple choice-related goals (Dhar and Simonson 1999),
such as the desire to buy a nice car within a particular budget,
or wishing to limit calorie intake while enjoying a tasty meal.
While the thought process leading to a choice might have a
smaller impact on inferences that can influence subsequent
choices when the choice process was less active, the impact
of the choice on goal achievement need not be affected by the
process leading to the choice and thus may not be attenuated by
defaults. Therefore, in contrast to our predictions that default
acceptance attenuates inference-based choice spillover, balan-
cing effects should be less sensitive to the thought processes
involved in making earlier choices. An example of this is the
case in which consumers are balancing multiple choices under
a budget constraint. Staying within budget when considering a
choice requires that consumers account for prior choices in the
sequence irrespective of whether the previous choices were
made actively or passively. The presence or absence of a
default in a prior choice is thus immaterial to such a budget-
based balancing process.
Finally, even if consumers choose an option other than the
default, the mere presence of a default, and its active rejection,
may still affect inference-based choice spillover compared with
making the same choice in the absence of a default. First,
rejecting a default requires consideration of why the prese-
lected option is not acceptable and may also prompt specula-
tion about the choice architect’s motive in specifying the
default. Such deliberations could make rejecting the default
an even more thoughtful choice than making the same selection
in the absence of a default and, thus, increase choice spillover.
Second, the fact that a particular option was set as the default
may be interpreted as a recommendation, which could lead to
preference updating in the direction of the default option. Such
a recommendation effect could counteract, and potentially
reverse, the hypothesized choice spillover effect resulting from
active rejection of a default.
In summary, the essence of our theorizing is as follows.
Choice of a particular option either in the absence of a default
or when a default is present but is rejected represents an active
choice that supports consumer inference making, thus promoting
spillover to subsequent choices. Preference updating results in a
positive choice spillover, whereas background contrast effects
produce negative choice spillover. If the selection of an option
takes the form of default acceptance, representing a more passive
choice, consumer inference making is suppressed and, as a
result, the preference updating and background contrast effects
are attenuated (relative to the same option being chosen
actively). Because balancing is less inference-based, it is less
sensitive to whether choices are made via default acceptance.
Experiment 1: Sequential Choice of Similar
Products
Experiment 1 aims to test the hypothesis that selecting a par-
ticular option represents a less thoughtful, more passive choice
when it is a default than when it is not and, consequently,
attenuates inference-based spillover effects on a subsequent
choice. We employed a paradigm designed to elicit a
background-contrast effect (Simonson and Tversky 1992), a
well-established form of choice spillover that is sensitive to
decision-maker thoughtfulness (Priester, Dholakia, and Flem-
ming 2004).
Background-contrast effects emerge when attribute trade-
offs that are manifest in a choice among a set of options differ
substantially from those experienced in a previous choice
(among different options) within the same domain (Simonson
and Tversky 1992). For instance, if the difference in price
between a lower- and a higher-quality product (e.g., a three-
star and a four-star hotel) in an initial choice is very large (very
small), a background is established against which a moderate
price difference between these same two quality tiers in a sub-
sequent choice is then perceived to be smaller (larger). The
result is a negative spillover effect such that greater inclination
to choose a low-quality (high-quality) option in the first choice
is followed by greater preference for a high-quality (low-qual-
ity) option in the next choice.
Background-contrast effects hinge on decision making
being sufficiently thoughtful to support the generation of an
inference about attribute trade-offs from the initial choice and
application of that inference to the subsequent choice. Indeed,
prior work has shown that such effects are suppressed under
conditions that engender low thoughtfulness (Priester, Dhola-
kia, and Flemming 2004). If, as we argue, accepting a default is
a passive, less thoughtful, choice, the background-contrast
effect should be attenuated when the initial selection is made
by merely accepting the default option (compared with a more
active choice).
Method
A total of 2,498 residents of the United States recruited from
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform completed the
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experiment. After providing basic demographic information
(gender, age, and language most commonly spoken), partici-
pants were presented with an instructional manipulation check
(IMC; Oppenheimer, Meyvis, and Davidenko 2009). Those
who failed the IMC were directed to reread the instructions
before continuing, and those who failed a second time (138)
were dismissed and therefore did not complete the experiment.
At the end of the study, participants responded to a distraction
self-report,1 were shown a debriefing statement, and were
asked to either confirm their consent or withdraw their data.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the five con-
ditions of a 2 (default: absent vs. present)  2 (background
contrast: inexpensive vs. expensive) plus control between-
subjects design. They all first completed four training choices,
which entailed indicating one’s preference among pairs of
paintings, to become familiar with the choice interface and the
manner in which defaults were implemented.2 Next, partici-
pants were instructed to imagine that they were planning a trip
to Canada and that they were to choose a hotel in each of two
cities—Toronto and Montreal. For each city, participants chose
between a higher-quality, higher-price (four-star) and a lower-
quality, lower-price (three-star) hotel. In the experimental con-
ditions, participants first selected a Toronto hotel and then a
Montreal hotel. The former (Toronto) was used to manipulate
the background contrast, whereas the latter (Montreal) served
as the focal choice. In the control condition, the focal choice
(Montreal) was the first hotel choice participants made, fol-
lowed by the Toronto hotel choice. This condition enables a
quantification of the baseline spillover associated with the dif-
ferent background contrasts.
We conducted a series of pretests to calibrate the stimuli (for
all experiments).3 Table 1 provides an overview of the hotel
stimuli used in Experiment 1. For the focal (Montreal) choice,
the prices of the three-star and four-star options were $129 and
$159, respectively. The prices of the Toronto hotels were
manipulated to induce the desired background-contrast effects
with the aim that the option that is favored by a particular con-
trast would be preferred by the vast majority of participants. In
the inexpensive-background-contrast condition, the higher-
quality Toronto option is favored because the price difference
between the quality tiers is small ($5). Conversely, in the
expensive-background-contrast condition, the lower-quality
Toronto option is favored due to a large price difference between
the quality tiers ($150). In the default-present conditions, the
default was applied to the option that is favored by the back-
ground contrast. Consequently, most participants were expected
to choose this option irrespective of whether a default was set.
This design allows us to test the effect of the mere presence of a
default in the first (Toronto) choice on subsequent preference as
revealed in participants’ focal (Montreal) choice and enables
valid comparisons of choice shares among conditions.
Results and Discussion
Data from 107 participants were excluded from analysis based
on self-reported distractions or technical problems. This leaves
a usable sample of 2,391 (Mage ¼ 38.22 years, SDage ¼ 12.39
years; 56.4% female).
We fit a logit model to examine the likelihood of choosing
the higher-price hotel in the first (Toronto) choice as a function
of background contrast, default, and their interaction. Only a
main effect of background contrast emerges (b ¼ 4.11, p <
.001). As we expected, there is no main effect of default in the
first choice (b¼ .05, p¼ .837), nor is the interaction significant
(b ¼ .30, p ¼ .323). As we intended, the vast majority of
participants in the experimental conditions chose the
background-favored option—that is, the lower (higher) quality
hotel in the expensive (inexpensive) background-contrast con-
dition (no-default conditions: 85.4% and 91.3%, respectively;
default conditions: 88.2% and 91.6%, respectively).
The results of the focal (Montreal) hotel choice (Table 2)
reveal a substantial difference in choice shares between the two
background-contrast conditions. We fit a logit model to con-
firm the background-contrast effect and test for attenuation of
this effect by the default. We examine the likelihood of choos-
ing the higher-price hotel in the focal (Montreal) choice as a
function of background contrast, default, and their interaction.
First, choice shares are affected by the background contrast (b
¼ 1.18, p< .001) and by the presence of a default (b¼ .30, p¼
.024). Importantly, these main effects are qualified by a signif-
icant interaction (b ¼ .54, p ¼ .004), indicating that the spill-
over effect is attenuated when the background-favored option
has been set as a default in the initial choice. Considering that
the vast majority selects this option in the initial choice, irre-
spective of whether it has been preselected as a default, this
interaction supports our hypothesis that choosing an option
when it is a default (i.e., making a passive choice) attenuates
the choice spillover effect relative to when it is not.
Table 1. Options for Hotel Choices.
Low-Price
Option
High-Price
Option
Toronto choice:
inexpensive background
contrast
Quality Three-star
standard
Four-star luxury
Price $134 per night $139 per night
Toronto choice:
expensive background
contrast
Quality Three-star
standard
Four-star luxury
Price $119 per night $269 per night
Montreal choice:
focal choice
Quality Three-star
standard
Four-star luxury
Price $129 per night $159 per night
1 This end-of-study procedure was used in all three experiments. For details of
the distraction self-report and exclusion criteria that had been established a
priori and were applied in all experiments, see Web Appendix 2.
2 The training choices were (purposefully) not informative with respect to our
theorizing because they were identical for all participants and designed to
ensure exposure to all key features of the choice interface.
3 The choice shares observed in these pretests guided our sample size target of
500 per condition.
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Comparing the choice shares in the experimental conditions
with those in the control condition, where the focal choice was
not preceded by a prior (background) choice, provides insight
into the dynamics driving the background-contrast effect and
its attenuation by the presence of a default. In the absence of a
default in the (earlier) Toronto choice, the inexpensive back-
ground contrast significantly reduces the choice probability of
the higher-price Montreal hotel relative to control (b ¼ .30, p
¼ .021). In line with our theorizing, this effect is fully attenu-
ated in the default-present condition (b ¼ .01, p ¼ .958), such
that choice probability of the higher-price Montreal hotel is
significantly greater than in the default-absent condition (b ¼
.30, p ¼ .024). Similarly, in the default-absent condition, the
expensive background contrast significantly increases the
choice probability of the higher-price Montreal hotel relative
to control (b ¼ .87, p < .001). This effect is attenuated margin-
ally in the default-present condition, in which the choice prob-
ability is lower than in the default-absent condition (b ¼ .24,
p < .069) but remains significantly greater compared with
control (b ¼ .63, p < .001). Further results of an analysis of
the focal choices conditional on the initial choice are available
in Web Appendix 1.
The results of Experiment 1 show that, in line with our
theorizing that accepting a default reduces the thoughtfulness
of the choice, the background-contrast effect is attenuated
when the initial choice was made by accepting a default. For
a background-contrast effect to arise, consumers must process
the background information from the first choice, make an
inference from it, and apply that inference in the subsequent
choice. Accepting a default reduces this inference-based choice
spillover.
Experiment 2: Sequential Choice of Different
Products in a Package
Experiment 2 examines the impact of defaults on spillover
between choices of different products made in sequence—a
hotel and a car rental—to test our hypothesis that defaults
systematically attenuate choice spillover arising in the form
of preference updating. The attributes for the hotel options are
identical to those in the inexpensive background-contrast con-
dition in Experiment 1. However, Experiment 2 was designed
differently from Experiment 1 on two important points so that
we did not expect a background-contrast effect to emerge.
First, the choices in Experiment 2 involve two different
domains. They are related to each other only insofar as they
are both modules in the configuration of a packaged consump-
tion experience. Whereas inferences about the trade-off
between price and quality arising from one choice are easily
applied to another choice in the same domain, as in Experiment
1, mapping such inferences to a different domain, from a hotel
to a car rental in Experiment 2, is more difficult and less obvi-
ously relevant. Second, the price difference associated with
higher quality does not differ substantially between the two
choices in Experiment 2 ($5 in the hotel choice and $7 in the
car rental choice), eliminating the contrast of trade-off values
that typically gives rise to a background-contrast effect.
Together, these factors mitigate against the emergence of a
background-contrast effect and increase opportunities for the
preference signal derived from the first (hotel) choice to spill
over to the focal (car rental) choice. Therefore, we expect pre-
ference updating such that a choice of the higher-price option in
the first (hotel) choice when that choice does not have a default
(active choice) increases the probability of participants choos-
ing the higher-price option in the focal (car rental) choice, and
attenuation of this choice spillover when the high-price hotel
option is preselected as the default and accepted (passive
choice).
Method
A total of 1,845 unique residents of the United States recruited
from the Prolific online research platform (www.prolific.co)
completed the experiment. They provided basic demographic
information, responded to an IMC, and experienced four train-
ing trials identical to Experiment 1. Participants who failed the
IMC were asked to reread the instructions before continuing
and were presented with the same IMC again. Participants were
randomly assigned to one of three conditions (default present,
default absent, and control).
Following the training trials (identical to Experiment 1),
participants were introduced to a travel scenario in which they
were planning a trip to Toronto, Canada and needed to book a
hotel and a car rental. Each of these decisions involved choos-
ing from two options characterized by two positively correlated
attributes; quality and price (see Table 3). Participants in the
experimental conditions selected the hotel first and then made
the focal car rental choice. Participants in the control condition
made the focal car rental choice first. In the default-present
condition, the high-price hotel option was preselected, with a
checkmark appearing in the selection box below that option
and the statement “Recommended for you!” appearing above
the selection box.
Results and Discussion
We excluded data from 256 participants from analysis: 200
failed the IMC twice and 56 self-reported distractions or tech-
nical problems, leaving a sample of 1,589 (Mage¼ 35.71 years,
SDage ¼ 12.49 years; 54.7% female) usable participants. Con-
sistent with Experiment 1, examination of the nonfocal hotel
Table 2. Choice Share Results (Experiment 1).
Choice Share of High-Price
Option in Focal Choice
(Montreal Hotel)
Default Absent Default Present
Inexpensive background contrast 38.2% 45.4%
Expensive background contrast 66.7% 61.0%
Control (no background choice) 45.6%
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choice as a function of whether a default was present does not
reveal a significant effect (logit model, b ¼ .37, p ¼ .119). In
both conditions, the vast majority of participants chose the
high-price hotel, which represented much better value for
money (default present ¼ 91.2%, default absent ¼ 93.7%).
At the aggregate level, we observe that choice of the high-
price car rental is significantly more likely in the default-absent
condition (45.1%) compared with control (31.6%; b ¼ .58, p <
.001). As the vast majority chose the high-price hotel in the first
choice, this difference is evidence of spillover of the choice for
high price and high quality from the initial hotel choice to the
focal car rental choice when no default is present. This choice
spillover supports our theorizing that actively selecting a high-
price, high-quality option in the initial choice facilitates pre-
ference updating that favors high-price, high-quality options
and thus increases the likelihood of selecting the option with
those characteristics in the subsequent choice.
In line with our theorizing, this difference in choice share is
attenuated in the default-present condition (33.3%), with
choice of the high-price car rental option being significantly
less likely than when the default is absent (b¼.50, p< .001),
and not significantly different from control (b¼ .08, p¼ .562).
Because the hotel choice was calibrated to control for a possi-
ble shift in choice shares between the conditions with and
without default, this pattern of results provides evidence of
attenuation of choice spillover arising in the form of preference
updating when a default is accepted. Nevertheless, because a
small proportion of participants rejected the default in the hotel
choice—in which case we expect choice spillover favoring the
low-price option in the focal (car rental) choice—it is important
to inspect the effects conditional on default acceptance.
As we have hypothesized, choice of the high-price car rental
option in the second choice is less likely when the high-price
hotel is passively chosen by accepting a default (35.8%) than
when it is actively chosen in the absence of a default (47.9%; b
¼ .50, p < .001). It is interesting to note what happens when
the default is rejected, as this is also an active choice that we
expect to result in a choice spillover comparable to when the
option is chosen in the absence of a default. Indeed, although
rejecting the default in favor of the low-price hotel in the first
choice is not common, we find that when it does occur, the
choice share of the low-price car rental option (93.3%) is sim-
ilar to when the low-price hotel is actively selected in the
absence of a default (97.1%). The difference between the
choice shares in these two conditions is not significant (b ¼
.86, p ¼ .467), in support of our theorizing that rejecting a
default represents an active choice, similar to choosing in the
absence of a default, from which updated preferences can spill
over to a subsequent choice.
The results of Experiment 2 further support our theorizing
that inference-based choice spillover effects in a sequence of
choices depend on whether an option is chosen when it is set as
a default. In this experiment, the default was accompanied by
an explicit recommendation, which may not always be the case
in real-world applications. Therefore, we do not include such a
recommendation in the next experiment. In addition, whereas
Experiment 2 featured choices related to different experiential
products in a package, the next experiment more closely resem-
bles the subsequent field study as it involves the configuration
of modules of a single product.
Experiment 3: Sequential Choices in a Single
Product Configuration
In Experiment 3, participants were presented with a scenario
about purchasing a new sofa for their living room as part of a
redecoration project. Each choice—selecting the construction
material for the sofa frame and the fabric for the sofa uphols-
tery—involves choosing from two options characterized by
three attributes: material, durability rating, and price. Again,
we are interested in the dynamic effects of the presence of a
default on spillover of the same choice without a default, but in
this experiment we did not calibrate a strongly dominant option
in the first choice so we can also more closely study the effects
associated with rejection of the default.
Our theorizing suggests that inference-based choice spill-
over depends on the joint effects of the nature of the initial
choice, the presence or absence of a default, and the acceptance
versus rejection of the default given it is present. Having not
calibrated a strongly dominant option in the first choice, we
have no basis on which to form a hypothesis about a difference
in the aggregate choice shares between default-absent and con-
trol conditions. However, if, as we hypothesize, accepting a
default attenuates preference updating but rejecting a default
does not, choice of the high-price option in the focal choice will
be attenuated when a default is present in the prior choice. This
effect can be expected because preference updating favoring
the high-price option should be attenuated by default accep-
tance, whereas preference spillover favoring the low-price
option should not be attenuated by default rejection.
Method
A total of 1,601 unique residents of the United States recruited
from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform completed the
experiment. Participants were randomly assigned to one of
three conditions (default absent, default present, and control),
provided basic demographic information, responded to an
IMC, and experienced four training trials identical to the
Table 3. Options for the Hotel and Focal Car Rental Choices
(Experiment 2).
Hotel Choice Focal Car Rental Choice
Low-Price
Option
High-Price
Option
Low-Price
Option
High-Price
Option
Quality Three-star
standard
Four-star
luxury
Standard
sedan
Luxury
sedan
Price $134 per
night
$139 per
night
$42 per day $49 per day
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previous experiments. Participants who failed the IMC were
asked to reread the instructions before continuing, and 93 who
failed the IMC a second time were prevented from continuing
and therefore did not complete the experiment.
Following the training trials, participants read a sofa pur-
chase scenario involving three modules for configuration of the
product. They were informed that they had already decided the
sofa design—the first module—with a base price of $1,000,
that they needed to choose the upholstery fabric and frame
construction material—the remaining two modules—and that
the cost for each option they selected would be added to the
base price to determine the total price of their new sofa. The
same frame and fabric options were presented across all con-
ditions (see Table 4). The focal choice in the experiment was
participants’ fabric choice. Participants in the experimental
conditions selected the frame first followed by the focal fabric
choice, whereas in the control condition, participants selected
the fabric first. In the default condition the high-price frame
option was preselected as the default, with a checkmark appear-
ing in the box below that option.
Results and Discussion
Data from 35 participants who self-reported more than one
distraction or a technical problem were excluded from analysis,
leaving a final sample of 1,566 (Mage ¼ 38.69 years, SDage ¼
12.40 years; 52.2% female). We first examined the nonfocal
frame choice as a function of whether the default was present.
As in the first two experiments, there is no significant differ-
ence in choice of the high-price frame option when it is set as a
default (default present ¼ 71.9%, default absent ¼ 73.5%, b ¼
.08, p ¼ .587). This may reflect a strong bimodal preference
for frame options in the sample that is not shifted by the default.
Despite the lack of an immediate effect on frame choices,
the default has an important effect on the subsequent focal
fabric choice. Specifically, choice of the high-price option in
the focal fabric choice is significantly reduced when a default is
present in the first choice (68.9%) compared with when the
default is absent (77.1%; b ¼ .42, p ¼ .003). This effect
conforms to our expectation that choice of the high-price
option in the focal choice will be attenuated when a default
is present at the high-price option in the prior choice.
Our theorizing about preference updating in the absence of a
default suggests that participants selecting the high- (low-) price
option in the frame choice are more (less) likely to select the
high-price option in the focal fabric choice than they would have
been had they not first made the frame choice. Although this
theorizing does not lead to a specific hypothesis about the net
effect of these opposing forces, these opposite effects on choice
likelihood might in some cases cancel each other out. In accord
with this possibility, we do not find a significant difference in the
focal fabric choice between the default-absent (77.1%) and con-
trol (75.9%) conditions (b ¼ .07, p ¼ .631), and choice of the
high-price fabric option is lower compared with control in the
default-present condition (b ¼ .35, p ¼ .012).
Although our theorizing offers an explanation for the lack of
a significant difference between the default-absent and control
conditions, there is another possible explanation that must be
considered: that the focal choice shares reflect stable prefer-
ences. However, stable preferences cannot account for the
observed reduction in choice share for the high-price option
in the default-present condition. Given that the default does not
affect choice share in the frame choice, a stable preferences
explanation implies that the presence of default in the frame
choice should also have no impact on the choice share in the
focal fabric choice. By contrast, our preference updating expla-
nation does account for the impact of the default. Specifically,
our contention that accepting a default attenuates preference
updating, but rejecting a default does not, implies that (1)
choice of the high-price option in the focal fabric choice is
reduced among those who choose a high-price frame when that
frame choice is made by accepting a default, and (2) choice of
the low-price option in the focal fabric choice is not reduced
among those who first choose the low-price frame option when
that frame choice is made by rejecting the default. Inspecting
the focal choice shares conditional on frame choice offers addi-
tional insight into these hypothesized dynamic effects.
As we expected, participants’ choice of the high-price option
in the focal fabric choice was significantly lower when they
selected the high-price option in the frame choice by accepting
the default (79.4%) compared with when they made the same
frame choice in the absence of a default (85.3%; b ¼ .41, p ¼
.034). This result is consistent with an attenuation of preference
updating, but not with a stable preferences explanation. Also as
we expected, participants’ choice of the low-price option in the
focal frame choice was not reduced when they selected the low-
price option in the frame choice by rejecting the default. Instead,
the choice share for the low-price fabric option (54.3%) was
significantly greater compared with when participants made the
same frame choice in the absence of a default (45.7%; b¼ .49, p
¼ .042). This result is also not consistent with a stable prefer-
ences explanation, but it does conform to our speculation that
rejecting a default may boost choice spillover because it may
involve an even more thoughtful choice than making the same
selection in the absence of a default.
The results of Experiment 3 highlight that firms using a
default with the intention of boosting sales of higher-price
options might obtain a surprising outcome contrary to their
intentions. In this sofa configuration scenario, the net effect
of the high-price default on consumers’ final product
Table 4. Options for Frame and Focal Fabric Choice (Experiment 3).
Frame Choice Focal Fabric Choice
Low-Price
Option
High-Price
Option
Low-Price
Option
High-Price
Option
Material 3=4 inch
plywood
Kiln-dried
hardwood
Polyester
fabric
Microfiber
fabric
Durability
rating
Good (3/5) Excellent (4/5) Good (3/5) Excellent (4/5)
Price $159 $259 $119 $299
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configuration could be undesirable to a firm. The average final
price of the configured sofa is lower when the high-price option
is preselected as a default in the frame choice ($1,474.03) than
if no default is preselected ($1,490.27; t(1017) ¼ 2.50, p ¼
.006). Rather than benefiting a firm by increasing revenue as a
manager might expect, preselecting a high-quality, high-price
option as a default has the potential to reduce the price custom-
ers ultimately pay for the configured product by driving some
consumers to make lower-price, lower-quality selections in
subsequent choices. Next, we report on a field study in which
our theorizing about the moderating effect of defaults on choice
spillover is tested in a more complex product configuration
system and the implications of these dynamics for firm revenue
are explored.
Field Study: Sequential Consumer Choice
with Defaults in an Online Car Customization
System
To further validate our theorizing in the field and to illustrate
the managerial relevance of the theorizing, we present a field
study that was conducted in collaboration with a major car
manufacturer. We observed the sequences of choices made
by car buyers who used the firm’s online product customization
system to configure their vehicle. Default settings were
manipulated across four experimental conditions. The results
shed light on how the dynamic effects of defaults revealed in
the tightly controlled experiments reported above play out in a
less restrained context characteristic of the product configura-
tion environments consumers regularly encounter.
Design of the Field Study
The field study was conducted in collaboration with a premium
car manufacturer using that firm’s live online product customi-
zation system. The car customization system consisted of a
series of different screens containing multiple modules, each
with multiple possible options that consumers could select (for
details, see Web Appendix 3). Consumers who accessed the
customization system were invited to use an experimental beta
version. Participating consumers were randomly assigned to
one of four experimental conditions. Consumers who chose not
to participate used the standard version of the customization
system.4 The standard and experimental versions of the custo-
mization system differed only in that (unbeknownst to the con-
sumers) different defaults were set in each of the four
experimental versions, whereas the standard customization sys-
tem contained no defaults.
The first step in designing the field study was the selection,
from the large number of customization options available, of
the modules and default options that could be manipulated. We
conducted several interviews with representatives from the
firm we worked with for this purpose. Although we were not
permitted to change all available modules, following discus-
sions with the firm, five modules were used to vary the defaults
in the customization system: business package, rims, uphols-
tery, steering wheels, and front seats.
We defined four treatment conditions that differed in terms
of the defaults that were implemented, the extent to which
high-price options were preselected as defaults, and the total
number of defaults (see Table 5). The conditions were con-
structed in consultation with the car manufacturer such that
an increasingly positive immediate effect of the default condi-
tions on the price of the final car configuration was expected.
Condition 1 included the most basic and smallest set of
defaults, which were the basic type of upholstery and the busi-
ness package. By contrast, Condition 4 included the most lux-
urious and largest set of defaults, which were high-end rims,
advanced steering wheel, leather seats, electronic front seats
with memory functions, and the business package. Two inter-
mediate sets of defaults were implemented in Conditions 2
and 3.
The field study in the car customization system lasted 49
weeks. At the end of this period, we had obtained observations
of 308 car configurations in Condition 1, 291 car configura-
tions in Condition 2, 254 car configurations in Condition 3, 270
car configurations in Condition 4, and 7,485 car configurations
in the no-defaults standard customization system.5 This means
that 13% of all configurations were designed in an experimen-
tal system with defaults. On average, consumers configured a
car priced at approximately €58,000 across all conditions.
Model Free Results
A key initial question is what impact the defaults have on the
price of consumers’ configured cars. To gain initial insights
into the prevalence of immediate effects of defaults and their
subsequent effects in modules without defaults, we analyzed
the prices of the configured cars as well as the prices within the
modules that did/did not have a preselected default. Because
much of the variation in car prices is driven by the body style
(e.g., sedan, station wagon), engine, and transmission, we con-
trol for this variation by subtracting the average price level for
each combination of body style, engine, and transmission from
the total car price, based on the observed car configurations
without defaults. Importantly, these three modules were
4 This aspect of the experimental approach was imposed by our industry
partner. It would have been preferable to use random assignment between
control and the cluster of treatment conditions. It is important to note,
however, that this self-selection only affected whether consumers entered
into any of the experimental conditions with defaults (vs. the control
condition). They were assigned randomly to one of the four treatment
conditions. Thus, self-selection is a potential contaminant of comparisons to
control, but not of any differences among the four treatment conditions.
5 Although the number of customers (and thus the overall attrition rate) was
approximately equal across experimental conditions, we cannot rule out the
possibility that attrition might have been affected by the different default
settings in each of the conditions.
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selected on the first screen of the customization system, always
before consumers encountered a default.
Figure 1 depicts the impact of the defaults in each of the
experimental conditions on the price of the configured car
relative to that in the standard customization system without
defaults. The first bar represents for each condition the imme-
diate effect of the defaults on the price paid for the correspond-
ing modules, the second bar the subsequent effect of the
defaults on the price paid for the modules that did not have
defaults preselected, and the third bar the effect of the defaults
on the total price. For the lowest price condition 1, the figure
shows an immediate positive effect of defaults—an increase in
configured price on the attributes where a default is set—of
€260. The defaults also have a negative subsequent effect,
decreasing configured price by €286 on the remaining attri-
butes. Together, these opposing effects result in a net decrease
in total configured price of €25.6 From the figure, it is clear that
defaults do affect the price of the car configuration not only
through an immediate effect on the focal modules as expected
but also by changing consumer choices for subsequent mod-
ules. These subsequent effects are sufficiently large and differ-
ent across the conditions for more positive immediate effects
on price not to be revenue maximizing in all conditions when
the subsequent effects are accounted for: Compare Condition 4
(which has the largest immediate effect but a negative subse-
quent effect) with Condition 2 (in which both the immediate
and subsequent effects are positive) and it is clear that Condi-
tion 2 results in higher overall revenue despite the defaults in
that condition having a smaller immediate effect than in Con-
dition 4.
Econometric Analysis
Although we find an impact of the sets of defaults on total
price, evaluating the precise effects of each individual default
on spillover is not possible in our initial analysis, as the defaults
are embedded in a sequence of choices with multiple defaults in
each condition. Thus, we revert to a model-based approach to
infer the effects of defaults on spillover from the field data. For
this purpose, we develop a model that captures the three key
components of our theory: (1) there are inference-based spil-
lover effects across choices of the various modules, (2) when a
choice follows a preselected default, these choice spillover
effects are attenuated, and (3) when a default is present but not
chosen, these choice spillover effects are retained.
The model characterizes a sequence of choices that a con-
sumer makes across modules that jointly make up the complete
product. For each module, consumers choose between different
options that can be described in terms of their features, such as
price and material composition. To illustrate, a car’s module
“exterior color” could have as options “metallic blue” and
“black,” each with a different price and durability level as
features. To study spillover effects, we model the dynamics
in price sensitivity, as price is the only feature that is compa-
rable across the different modules.7 Given the large variation in
price levels and price ranges across modules, we rescale the
prices of each module such that the price of a module option n
for module m, Pm;n ranges from 1 to þ1 across the module
options (n ¼ 1, . . . , Nm) within each module (m ¼ 1, . . . , M).
This ensures that there are module options that are below and
above average in price.
To model consumers’ module option choices and the impact
of defaults on spillover across the sequence of choices, we
employ a random utility model with individual-level coeffi-
cients that capture systematic differences across consumers.
Consumers are assumed to select for each module the option
that provides them with the highest utility (McFadden 1986).
We define a consumer’s utility for an option for a particular
module as follows. For each consumer c (c¼ 1, . . . , C), module
m (m ¼ 1, . . . , M), and option n (n ¼ 1, . . . , Nm) with price
Pm;n, the utility that is obtained by the consumer is given by
Uc;m;n ¼ lm;n þ ac;mPm;n þ g Iðn ¼ Defaultm;cÞ þ Ec;m;n: ð1Þ
In this equation, an option’s utility is defined by three com-
ponents. First, an intercept lm;n that is specific to a particular
option n within a module m that captures aspects of the option
that are not directly connected to its price level Pm;n.
8 Second,
the impact of an option’s price level is captured by the price
coefficient ac,m, which varies across consumers to capture con-
sumer heterogeneity and varies across modules to capture pre-
ference dynamics, as we detail next. Third, the additional
utility arising from the fact that an option is set as the default
is captured by the product of g, which quantifies the change in
Table 5. Default Settings per Experimental Condition (Field Study).
Treatment Conditions
Modules for Which
Defaults Were Set
1
Low-Price
Defaults
2 3 4
High-Price
Defaults
Business package Y Y N Y
Rims 18-inch aluminum N Y N N
Rims 19-inch aluminum N N Y Y
Upholstery fabric type 1 Y N N N
Upholstery fabric type 2 N Y N N
Upholstery leather type 1 N N Y N
Upholstery leather type 2 N N N Y
Multifunction steering wheel N Y Y Y
Front seats with memory
function
N N Y Y
Notes: Y ¼ set as default option; N ¼ not set as default option.
6 The €1 difference stems from rounding.
7 The model can be modified to any setting in which consumers make a series
of choices and where these choices have at least one common preference
attribute (e.g., calories in a multicourse restaurant meal, physical intensity in
a sequence of recreational activities).
8 The first module option (n ¼ 1) is used as a reference category so lm;1 ¼ 0
that for all modules.
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utility, and an indicator function Iðn ¼ Defaultm;cÞ that is
equal to 1 when option n is set as the default for module m for
consumer c and 0 otherwise. If no default is specified for a
given module, the value of this indicator function is also 0.
Finally, the unexplained part of the consumer’s utility is cap-
tured by an error term Ec;m;n, which is assumed to follow an
i.i.d. extreme value Type I distribution for all values of c, m and
n, corresponding to the multinomial logit model.
Preference dynamics are essential to capture the process of
sequential preference construction when consumers make a
series of related choices in the presence of defaults. In our
utility specification, these effects are formalized as a spillover
of a consumer’s current choice on their utility of the available
options in subsequent choices. Specifically, because price is the
only common feature across attributes, a consumer’s price sen-
sitivity shifts as a function of the option they selected in the
previous choice. We account for the differential spillover
effects that result from defaults affecting the preference con-
struction process by having the update of the preference
weights depend on the previous choice having been the selec-
tion of a default (passive choice) or not (active choice) and, if it
was not a default, as a function of whether this active choice
was made from a set that did or did not include a default.
To formally capture this effect, we model the impact of the
previous module option choice on the price coefficient by
introducing a spillover parameter, bc;m, that governs how the
price of the chosen option influences preferences in subsequent
choices. In particular, we capture shifts in the price coefficient
through
ac;m ¼ ac;m1 þ bc;m
XNm1
n¼1
Pm1;nIðYc;m1 ¼ nÞ: ð2Þ
In this equation, the summation over the module options
selects the price, Pm1;n, of the module option that was chosen,
and bc;m captures the magnitude and direction of the change in
preference weights between subsequent choices. In this speci-
fication, positive values of bc;m indicate a choice spillover
effect such that a particular preference is reinforced by the
consumer’s choice—for instance, when choosing a low-price
option for a given module (i.e., the rescaled price Pm1;n<0)
results in a greater preference for lower-price options in sub-
sequent module choices (i.e., a more negative value for ac;m).
By contrast, negative values of bc;m indicate preference balan-
cing across choices such that a particular preference is attenu-
ated in the subsequent choice—for instance, when choosing a
low-price option initially causes a shift in preference toward
higher-price options in subsequent choices.
The impact of selecting a default or not on the spillover effect
is characterized by the following, more detailed, specification of
bc;m, which allows the spillover to be affected by if it is a default
that is chosen and by a default being present but not chosen.
These conditions, identified by IðYc;m1 ¼ Defaultm1Þ and
IðYc;m1 6¼ Defaultm1 and Defaultm1 6¼ 0Þ, respectively,
result in the following specification for the spillover:
bc;m ¼ d0 þ d1IðYc;m1 ¼ Defaultm1Þ
þ d2IðYc;m1 6¼ Defaultm1 and Defaultm1 6¼ 0Þ:
ð3Þ
The strength of the spillover that occurs in the absence of a
default is characterized by the baseline shift in preference
weights d0. Note that our theorizing does not provide a direc-
tional prediction for the preference updates in the absence of a
default. If, as in Experiments 2 and 3, individuals learn about
their preferences or are motivated to display consistency in
their preference for certain types of options (e.g., for
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Figure 1. Effects of defaults on the price of the configured car.
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high-price, high-quality/luxury options), we would expect to
observe choice spillover. This would be indicated by a positive
value of d0. However, if balancing (e.g., choice of a high-price
option resulting in a reduction in preference for higher-price
options in subsequent choices, which may be more likely to
occur when budget constraints are salient) or, as in Experiment
1, background-contrast effects dominate, d0 would be negative.
When multiple choice spillover effects operate, d0 represents
the resulting net spillover. For instance, if across a sequence of
choices both preference updating and balancing occur, the sign
of d0 will depend on the relative magnitude of these two choice
spillover effects.
The other two components of Equation 3 capture differences
in the spillover process that result when a default is present. If,
as we propose, the choice to accept the default is more passive
than a choice made in the absence of a default, this should
attenuate inference-based choice spillover. Inference-based
spillover effects thus drive d0, which captures the baseline spil-
lover effect, and d1; which captures the incremental change in
spillover when the default is accepted, in opposite directions.
Because the total configured price up to the current point in the
customization process is highly salient in the configurator
interface, we expect the baseline spillover effect in the field
data to include a balancing component that results from the
consumer’s budget constraint. Because budget-based balancing
is a less inference-based choice spillover, the balancing com-
ponent in the net spillover will be attenuated less by default
acceptance compared with the positive, inference-based,
preference-updating component. Under such circumstances,
the incremental spillover effect of accepting a default, d1; is
expected to be negative and can be even larger in magnitude
than d0 because the positive inference-based components of
the spillover effect will be more strongly attenuated than the
negative (non-inference-based) balancing component. When a
default is present but rejected, we also allow spillover to differ
from baseline, as captured by d2, because even though default
rejection is also an active choice, it may involve differences in
choice processing either by eliciting even more thoughtful
choice or via perception of the default as an implicit recom-
mendation. In the former case, spillover is shifted toward the
chosen option and away from the defaulted option, and in the
latter case, it is shifted toward the defaulted option and away
from the chosen option.
When estimating models with dynamic preferences, an
important consideration is that one must be cautious before
concluding that changes in estimated preferences truly reflect
a changing data-generating process and not an increasingly
more accurate assessment of a stable preference, because more
data become available when observing subsequent choices. In
particular, when the researcher assumes homogeneous prefer-
ences at the start of the process, this results in spurious learning
of the consumer-level preferences from behavior (Shin, Misra,
and Horsky 2012). This stems from the fact that the estimated
preference weight for a specific feature for a consumer who
systematically chooses module options that score high on that
specific feature will increase as more data become available.
This, however, is not because this person learned that they
prefer high levels of this module feature but because the
researcher learned this. This is similar to the need to control
for systematic differences in preferences to properly measure
spreading of preferences using the free-choice paradigm (Chen
and Risen 2010).
To prevent spurious learning effects, we include a
consumer-level random parameter ac;1 to capture consumer
heterogeneity at the start of the choice process. These random
parameters are assumed to follow a normal distribution. The
mean of the distribution is fixed at zero, as the level of a is not
identified when module option intercepts ðlm;nÞ are included
and there is no variation in the option features across individ-
uals. The variance is set at sa
2. We executed a simulation study
to verify the validity of this approach. The simulation study
was based on the estimated model parameters from the field
study and showed that (1) we are able to recover the correct
spillover effects when heterogeneity is accounted for, (2) not
accounting for initial preference heterogeneity biases the esti-
mated spillover effects as expected, and (3) when there are no
spillover effects, the approach does not infer spurious spillover
effects. Details of the simulation study are provided in the
Appendix.
Another aspect of the data that we control for in the econo-
metric model is that the diagnosticity of the features, in terms
of spillover effects, might vary across modules. This is espe-
cially relevant for our common feature, which is price. To
illustrate such differences in diagnosticity across modules, con-
sider a price difference of €200 between two engine options.
Given that engines are generally the most expensive module of
a car, consumers’ responses to a €200 price difference between
engine types might be small and less diagnostic about their
underlying module option preferences than a €100 price differ-
ence for a (much less expensive) steering wheel. To allow for
such differences across modules, we include a module-specific
scaling factor (ymÞ that rescales the observed price levels to
values that are comparable across modules (i.e., throughout our
model specification we use ymPm;n instead of Pm;n).
We perform model estimation using simulated maximum
likelihood, where the simulation is used to account for con-
sumer heterogeneity in their initial level of price sensitivity.
Table 6 presents the results for the key parameters representing
the immediate and dynamic effects of defaults on consumer
preference, as well as the baseline dynamic choice spillover
effect. We find that, as expected, there is a strong and positive
immediate default effect on the probability that a specific mod-
ule option is chosen (g ¼ 1.023, p < .001).
We also find a significant choice spillover effect of a con-
sumer’s current option choice on their price sensitivity in sub-
sequent choices. The baseline spillover effect of choosing a
more (less) expensive option when no default is set is that this
choice reduces (increases) the consumer’s price sensitivity in
later choices, in line with the predictions based on self-
perception and cognitive dissonance reduction. This choice
spillover effect is reflected by the positive value for d0 (.083,
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p< .001). We interpret this positive choice spillover to indicate
that preference updating dominates, such that any opposing
contribution from balancing must be of lesser magnitude.
The presence of a default changes the spillover effect. When
a consumer chooses an option that is preselected as the default,
the choice spillover effect of making an active choice is atte-
nuated. Consumers’ preferences for the options of the next
module no longer shift toward the chosen option (i.e., toward
the default). The effect of selecting the default option on spil-
lover to subsequent choices is reflected in the negative value of
d1 (.307, p < .001), which, together with the baseline spil-
lover effect, results in a net negative choice spillover effect
(d0 þ d1 ¼ .224, p < .001) compared with when no default
is present. When a high- (low-) price option that is preselected
as a default is chosen, preference for high- (low-) price options
in the subsequent choice are weakened. We interpret this neg-
ative effect as indicating that the balancing component comes
to dominate when preference updating is attenuated by default
acceptance. We surmise that this balancing effect is driven at
least in part by a budget constraint, which could be especially
resistant to attenuation when the budget constraint is made
salient by having the running total price visible in the config-
uration interface (which it always was in the field study). Bal-
ancing on a budget constraint is expected to be less sensitive to
attenuation by default acceptance because a budget constraint
remains constant across modules regardless of the choice
process.
When a default option is present, but the consumer deviates
from this default and instead (actively) chooses a different
option, the effect of the default on spillover is also in the
opposite direction of the baseline spillover effect, but much
less strongly so than when the default option is chosen (d2 ¼
.116, p¼ .002). This finding is consistent with the notion of a
default serving as an implicit recommendation, even if the
consumer does not selected it. In this case, the net impact of
the current choice on a consumer’s preferences as revealed in
subsequent choices is statistically indistinguishable from zero
ðd0 þ d2  0Þ.
General Discussion
This research examined the impact of defaults in a sequential
choice context using experimental data from three studies and
field data from customers of an automobile manufacturer who
configured their cars online. We find that defaults have a sys-
tematic effect on choice spillover in sequential choice pro-
cesses and that this effect depends on whether a default has
been accepted or rejected. Our findings have both theoretical
and practical implications.
Practical Implications
Our studies reveal that the presence of a default in one choice
of a sequential choice process has an impact on subsequent
choices. From a managerial perspective, this finding has poten-
tial consequences for the use and calibration of default settings
and their impact on consumer purchase behavior in sequential
choice settings. Gaining a detailed understanding of these con-
sequences is important and nontrivial, given the complex pat-
tern of immediate and spillover effects we observed in the field
study. Therefore, we now demonstrate how model-based simu-
lations can be used to gauge the immediate effects of defaults
as well as their effects on spillover of consumers’ constructed
preferences to subsequent choices (e.g., Dew and Ansari 2018).
The key to understanding the impact of a default option on
consumer behavior lies in an analysis of the combined effect
of the immediate effects of defaults and their effects on subse-
quent choices. To illustrate the total impact of defaults in the
car customization system from a managerial perspective, we
focus on the shift in consumer spending. This focus also allows
for a direct comparison of the immediate and subsequent
effects.
For illustrative purposes, we study the possible default
settings for the exterior mirrors module in the car customi-
zation system. Figure 2 shows for each option of this mod-
ule the predicted immediate, subsequent, and total effects on
the price of the configured car when an option in this mod-
ule is preselected as a default. For the lowest-price option,
the immediate effect is a reduction in the price of the
selected mirrors of €62, the subsequent effect is an increase
of €395 in the price of the car, and these two opposing
effects result in a predicted overall increase of €333 in the
average price of the configured car. By contrast, when the
highest-price option is preselected as the default, the imme-
diate effect is an increase of €68 in the price of the selected
mirrors, the subsequent effect is a €336 reduction in price,
and the resulting total effect is a reduction in the average
price of the configured car by €268. Counterintuitively, in
this illustrative example, preselecting the highest-price
option as the default is detrimental to the firm, in spite of
a gain in revenues on the exterior mirrors module itself.
Meanwhile, the simulation predicts that setting the lowest-
price option as the default benefits the firm.
An important feature of the exterior mirrors module is that
both the lowest-price and the highest-price options are rather
attractive (chosen in about 55% and 30% of the configured
cars). This helps explain the strong subsequent effects of the
defaults. Consider the 55% of customers who choose the
lowest-price option. In the absence of a default, choosing their
Table 6. Effects of Defaults on Consumer Utility.
Estimate SE p-Value
Immediate default effect ðgÞ 1.023 .037 <.001
Choice spillover effects
Spillover effect from choice when no
default is present (d0Þ
.083 .010 <.001
Incremental spillover from default
choice (d1Þ
.307 .053 <.001
Incremental spillover from not choosing
the default when it is present ðd2Þ
.116 .040 .002
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preferred low-price option results in preference updating in
favor of low-price options in subsequent choices. But when
this same choice is made by accepting a default, that choice
spillover is attenuated and preference balancing remains. Thus,
the spillover to subsequent choices favors higher-price options
to a greater degree than if these customers had actively made
the same low-price mirror choice in the absence of a default.
When performing the same analysis for all possible defaults
in the car customization system that we analyzed, we find that
for 111 options (67.3% of all options) the subsequent effect is
opposite to the immediate effect on the price of the configured
car, so focusing only on the immediate effect would overesti-
mate the impact of a default on firm revenues. For 52 of these
options (31.5% of all options) the subsequent effect on price is
not only opposite but also larger in magnitude. For 38 of these
options, all of which are low-price options set as defaults, the
immediate effect on price is negative and the total effect is
positive, while for 14 options across 9 modules we find that
a positive immediate effect of setting the option as a default
would result in a negative total effect on revenues.
Managers who intend to use defaults to increase total rev-
enues or profits thus need to look beyond the focal module
when setting default levels in a context where consumers go
through a sequence of related choices. Defaults that attenuate
spillover of preference for higher-price options will be less
effective than the immediate effect would suggest and may
even have a total impact opposite to the one anticipated when
only the immediate effect would be accounted for. Setting a
high-price option as the default brings with it the risk of back-
firing and hurting total revenues. Another important implica-
tion of our findings, which managers may also find surprising,
is that there are circumstances under which setting a low-price
option as the default in one module could increase total reven-
ues by boosting choice of higher-price options in subsequent
modules.
Theoretical Implications
From a theoretical perspective, our research provides new
insights into the dynamic impact of defaults on consumer deci-
sion making. While there is much evidence in the literature
concerning the immediate effects of defaults on consumer
choice (Brown and Krishna 2004; Johnson and Goldstein
2003; Smith, Goldstein and Johnson 2013), to the best of our
knowledge we are the first to investigate dynamic effects of
defaults on consumer preferences in subsequent choices in
sequential choice processes. We propose that accepting a
default is a more passive choice than both rejecting a default
or making a choice in the absence of a default. In a series of
experiments and a field study, we showed that choice spillover
effects are indeed influenced by the presence of a default, as we
predicted. Analysis of individual choice sequences reveals that
inference-based choice spillover effects are attenuated when
the default is accepted.
The effect of rejecting a default on choice spillover is more
variable and is worthy of future research. Rejecting the default
has the potential to increase preference updating, as we find in
Experiment 3, possibly because consumers engage additional
mental resources to consider why the default should be
rejected. In Experiment 2 and in the field study, however,
rejecting the default results in spillover effects similar to or
smaller than those that arise when making that same choice
in the absence of a default, possibly due to a recommendation
effect.
In the field study using a sequence of choices required to
configure a complete car online, we relied on an econometric
model of sequential choice behavior. This model allowed for
preferences for features of the product to be constructed during
the choice process. Estimation results provide evidence that
later preferences (as revealed by subsequent choices) are pre-
dictably influenced by consumers’ earlier choices (i.e., choice
spillover, dynamic preference construal). Importantly, these
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Figure 2. Illustration of offsetting spillover effects.
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dynamics in consumer preferences were also modulated by the
presence of defaults, resulting in effects of defaults on spillover
to subsequent choices. We anticipated that, in the field data,
preference reinforcement through consumer self-perception
and cognitive dissonance reduction results in choice spillover
across modules that is reduced by the presence of a default. Our
findings support this prediction. When consumers chose an
option that was set as the default option, we find that the base-
line (default-absent) choice spillover effect of such choices
reverses. Instead of an increase in consumers’ preferences in
the next choice in line with the features of the chosen default,
there is net negative effect indicative of balancing. This switch
in the direction of the spillover effect due to a default suggests
that there are multiple spillover effects at play that differ in the
degree to which they are inference-based (preference updating
vs. balancing) and that are differentially attenuated when a
choice is made through default acceptance.
Conclusion
The topic of this research—sequential decisions with
defaults—is relevant in many markets where consumers make
a sequence of interrelated choices, such as when configuring
products (e.g., holiday packages, financial services) or when
selecting multiple options from a menu (e.g., a multicourse
restaurant meal). Although we tested the proposed effects of
defaults on choice spillover in tightly controlled experiments
and in field data that showed practical relevance by studying
important and impactful consumer decisions in the context of a
car customization tool, it would be interesting to examine
whether these findings hold in other types of markets where
spillover of constructed preferences may occur. In particular, it
could be interesting to see under which conditions subsequent
choices are sufficiently related to versus different from each
other for defaults to have an influence on spillover (e.g.,
Priester, Dholakia, and Flemming 2004). For example, multiple
decisions within the same product category in a store could
well be related enough for defaults to moderate choice spillover
effects (e.g., buying multiple fashion items), whereas decisions
made in different product categories in the same store (e.g.,
buying fashion items and consumer electronics) may constitute
different decision episodes that are not cognitively connected
by consumers (Dhar and Simonson 1999).
Another line of research that would be worthwhile to pursue
in future work is to study in greater detail the (possibly con-
flicting) underlying processes in consumer decision making
that determine the strength and direction of spillover effects
and how these processes are affected by the presence of
defaults. In this research, we have established that defaults
have systematic effects on choice spillover and that these
effects are dynamic in nature. However, these dynamic effects
may not always apply to balancing and may be moderated by
various factors. It would be worthwhile to examine in greater
depth the proposed process accounts of consumer inference and
active versus passive choice. For example, the salience of a
budget constraint (or a weight loss goal, in the case of
nutritional features of products) may moderate effects of
defaults on preference balancing. In addition, depending on the
level of involvement in the decision, consumers may be more
or less sensitized to the fact that their decision is partially
determined by the presence of a default. It is likely that depend-
ing on their awareness of this influence, the effect of the default
on choice spillover may also vary in strength. Similarly, the
type of default, a simple checkmark or a more descriptive label
(e.g., “Selected for You”) may result in different attention lev-
els and inferences that affect the impact of the default on spil-
lover effects. Consumers’ beliefs about the firm’s motives in
providing defaults (e.g., profit maximization, consumer satis-
faction) may also change their inferences. We hope that the
current work will serve as a foundation for such further inves-
tigations into the dynamic effects of defaults.
Appendix. Simulation Study on
Heterogeneity Correction in Field Study
The fact that choices and preferences are confounded makes
the analysis of the impact of a choice on subsequent choices
challenging. In the psychological literature, this has been iden-
tified by Chen and Risen (2010), while Shin, Misra, and Horsky
(2012) illustrated its consequences from a marketing modeling
perspective.
This appendix reports the results of a simulation study that
shows that controlling for initial preference heterogeneity
through a random-effects model can solve this problem. This
mimics the premeasurement proposed as a solution by Risen
and Chen (2010) through a latent estimate of the (unobserved)
initial preferences.
The simulation study relies on a scenario with 20 attributes,
each with three levels. The levels have equal baseline utilities
but differ in their price levels. Each attribute has one level
priced at 1, one level priced at 0, and one level priced at 1,
consistent with the normalization of prices used in the main
model. Half of the simulated sample has no defaults, and the
other half receives a default for attributes 10 and 15 in the
sequence. The level that is set as default for each attribute is
randomly selected from the three levels of that attribute. The
specification of preference heterogeneity and preference
dynamics is based on the model developed for the field study.
Finally, customers’ choice behavior is simulated based on the
specified econometric model and the parameter estimates we
obtained.
To analyze the accuracy of the proposed approach, we esti-
mate the full model, as well as a model that does not account
for initial preference heterogeneity, for comparison purposes.
The results are reported in Table A1. In addition, we simulate
data where there is preference heterogeneity, but no preference
updating (i.e., all d parameters as reported in the article are
zero). The latter simulation enables us to test whether the pro-
posed approach spuriously picks up choice spillover even
though it is not present in the data.
The results from the simulation study show that the pro-
posed approach that controls for initial preference
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heterogeneity is indeed able to retrieve the correct parameter
values—that is, the results are all very close to the parameter
estimates obtained from the field data that were used to gen-
erate the simulations. The results also show that when the
heterogeneity in initial preferences is not accounted for in the
model, this leads to an overestimation of the baseline spillover
effect, with d0 ¼ .277, which falsely suggests much larger
baseline spillover effects than those that underlie the simulated
data (d0 ¼ .083). Thus, there is a clear need to account for
heterogeneity as we do in the proposed approach. The final
column in Table A1 shows that when there is no preference
updating, this is also correctly inferred by the proposed
approach, and no spurious spillover is identified, as all prefer-
ence update parameters are estimated to be virtually zero,
though d0 is statistically significant.
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